What’s wrong with the idea of letting virtuous elites rule? On the problem of instability in Confucian meritocracy

Democracy has faced significant challenges in recent times. Donald Trump, a well-known populist, won the U.S. presidential election and was re-elected for a second term. Several years ago, the people of the U.K. voted to leave the European Union, and the country is still grappling with the economic repercussions of this decision.

Confucian meritocracy

An increasing number of political theorists, such as Daniel Bell, Tongdong Bai, and Ruiping Fan, are skeptical of democracy and propose “Confucian meritocracy” as an appealing alternative to democracy. Inspired by the classical Chinese thinker Confucius, who said that good governance is to “promote those who are worthy and talented” (Analects 13.2), these theorists argue for a system that selects leaders based on ability and virtue, rather than through democratic elections. In any society, there are elites who are more knowledgeable and virtuous, making them better suited to achieve good governance than the average citizen. Our goal should be to design a fair mechanism for identifying and selecting these elites. As long as everyone has an equal opportunity for education and selection through this mechanism, greater power should be entrusted to these elites.

Who can be considered political elites?

I argue that Confucian meritocracy is overly optimistic in assuming a consensus on what constitutes good governance in modern societies. First of all, what do we mean by “elite”? When we talk about science, Albert Einstein is considered an elite because he excelled at discovering scientific truths. In the realm of soccer, Lionel Messi is an elite due to his exceptional dribbling and shooting skills. But in politics, what do we mean by an elite? Does it mean they are good at making economic policies? Formulating foreign policies? Possessing a respectable character? Or perhaps being skillful at manipulating people?

The issue is that, in modern societies, there are deep disagreements on what a government should do, which in turn leads to deep disagreements on what qualities political elites should possess. People may agree on some basic functions of the government. For example, a government should provide basic means of subsistence or ensure that citizens possess some fundamental virtues. However, even if people are fortunate enough to agree on a set of goals, there will still be deep disagreements on the prioritization of these goals. In other words, Confucian meritocrats assume that there is a general consensus on the definition of political elites, but the concept of political elites is inevitably a deeply controversial issue in modern pluralistic societies.

A Cycle of Apathy and Anger

Given this problem, people living under Confucian meritocracy inevitably suffer from a sense of estrangement. Here the sense of estrangement means a cognitive-affective experience in which one finds the government to be distanced and strange. They believe that the government “should” act in a certain way, but in reality, it acts differently or even in a completely opposite manner. Additionally, ordinary people in a Confucian meritocracy lack sufficient opportunities to influence the general direction of the country. In other words, they are compelled to accept a society governed by a government with which they disagree. Over time, they become alienated from politics, disliking how the government rules but having no choice but to accept it. While this can also occur in representative democracies, the sense of estrangement is more severe in Confucian meritocracy due to fewer opportunities for ordinary people to influence laws and policies, leaving them feeling disempowered.

Due to their experiences of estrangement, ordinary people in a Confucian meritocracy fall into a psychological cycle of apathy and anger. Typically, they are withdrawn and apathetic because public affairs are dictated by the elite, leading them to lose interest in the government and comply out of habit or fear of punishment. However, when the government severely undermines their basic interests, their apathy turns into anger, prompting them to express dissatisfaction through radical actions like riots and vigilantism that destabilize society. Once the anger subsides, they return to apathy. The public mood, therefore, oscillates between violent resistance and collective cynicism, undermining the long-term stability of society. In fact, this cycle of apathy and anger has been seen in many authoritarian societies where people lack peaceful avenues for meaningful political change.

The instability of Confucian meritocracy

Hence, in the long term, the stability of Confucian meritocracy is fragile. Although a meritocratic regime may sometimes appear more stable than a democracy, this stability is illusory because it stands on shaky ground. Once discontent reaches a breaking point, society can easily descend into chaos, which is often more turbulent than the social opposition seen in democracies. In democracies, ordinary people have the right to vote, and when protestors feel they have garnered sufficient public attention and sympathy, they may stop their protests and wait to express their will in the next election. However, in a Confucian meritocracy, ordinary people depend solely on the goodwill of the elites. If they lose trust in the elites, they may resort to any means, including violent methods, to pressure the elites and achieve their political goals. Confucian meritocracy is, therefore, like a time bomb.

In summary, the existing literature argues that Confucian meritocracy is empirically incorrect (e.g., presenting a rosy picture of some East Asian countries), theoretically inconsistent (e.g., the selection mechanism failing to select the elites it aims to choose), morally unfair (e.g., ignoring non-Confucians). I argue that, even if Confucian meritocracy is empirically correct, theoretically consistent, and morally fair, it is still undesirable due to its underlying risk of instability.